Do political actors change their policy agenda in advance when fearing they could lose this agenda to a constitutional court? Autolimitation - the process that ”the legislature censors its own behavior preemptively in anticipation of judicial review” (Vanberg 2001, 352) - has been speculated to be one of the major (indirect) powers of constitutional courts in influencing politics in Europe (see e.g. Landfried 1992). However, studying the potential existence of this mechanism current research is ‘front- loaded’. Thus, scholars focus on observable implications on the political side without taking strategic action of the court as one major actor explicitly into account. Hence, outlining the potential effects of autolimitation (e.g. Stone Sweet 1998; 2000; Vanberg 1998; 2001) the mechanisms causing this behavior remain uncovered.
Addressing this shortcoming this paper aims for developing an empirically testable conceptualization of autolimitation. It builds the argument that the situation between all actors involved is similar to negotiations over prices in economics. Political actors sell legislation to the court that is willing to buy the constitutionality only at a certain price which is unknown to the legislator beforehand. Using economic theory on the negotiation of prices under uncertainty I will approach the process of mutual compromise between political actors and the court assessing its wider implications for autolimitation.
