The (Self-)Marginalization of Independent Regulatory Agencies: The Regulatory Governance of Renewable Energy Auctions in Europe

In the late 20th century, Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) have become pillars of economic governance. However, IRAs have recently been under increasing politicization pressure, in some cases leading governments to encroach on their competences and independence. This article introduces a different approach to the redistribution of regulatory influence, whereby the governance of new policy instruments empowers alternative authorities – while marginalizing IRAs. To explore this phenomenon, the article focusses on the governance of renewable energy (RE) auctions in Europe, which is first mapped across all EU member states, and then subject to an in-depth study of the UK case. It finds that 1) IRAs’ marginalization in RE auctions is widespread in Europe, 2) best explained by paradigm change, featuring a mismatch between the IRA institutional model and new functional needs calling for more politics and governmental involvement, and 3) can be initiated by the IRA itself, a phenomenon we could call self-marginalization.