Whereas loyalty is never an option for a footloose utility-maximizing person, voice and exit could serve as close substitutes. In the aftermath of the financial crisis people`s opportunity to exert their voice has dramatically declined in Euro zone member countries: Citizens living in debtor countries face a coalition of parties who do not differ in their will to consolidate, whe-reas citizens in wealthier member states have no opportunity to express their voice against financial help towards Southern European member states. Due to this TINA-principle the only reasonable option to bring taxation closer to the benefit principle is to migrate into those countries who offer an attractive package in terms of public goods / taxation. However, many governments restrict the exit option of individuals / companies into foreign territories by ap-plying several avoidance measures. The present paper discusses how international income should be taxed based on the principles of horizontal equity, prohibition of arbitrariness, con-stitutional conservatism and tax system stability. It concludes that most, though not all avoid-ance measures of high-tax states massively violate freedom of choice. A violation could only be justified from a normative point of view if foreign low-tax countries offer measures which foster discriminatory taxation. Thus, the space for international tax cooperation should be mainly limited towards the abolishment of discriminatory measures. Tax avoidance / evasion share an ambivalent relationship with respect to the above-stated principles: On the one hand they may foster the erosion of these principles, on the other hand they serve as a final option in search for a “fiscal asylum”.
