Institutional Evaluation of the Communications Regulator in Iran: Relying on and Applying Institutional Theory

The proliferation of regulatory agencies and the rise of the regulatory state since the mid-20th century have positioned regulators as a central pillar of governance systems. In Iran, the communications market is a leading example of a sector with a modern regulatory body. This study evaluates and analyzes the status of Iran's communications regulator. Using regulatory governance literature, the descriptive layer examines the regulator through institutional indicators such as independence, accountability, and regulatory tools. We argue that the characteristics of regulators are shaped by their institutional environment. In the explanatory layer, institutional theory is employed to investigate the causes of the observed institutional indicators and the constraining effects of the regulatory environment, utilizing mechanisms such as institutional isomorphism and decoupling. Based on 32 semi-structured interviews and a review of regulatory documents and laws, we find that institutional isomorphism—through coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures—significantly influences Iran's communications regulator. Additionally, conflicting environmental pressures or tensions between external demands and internal efficiency often lead to decoupling, where the regulator separates its actual practices from its formal structure to maintain legitimacy. Our findings reveal that coercive isomorphism has the strongest impact on institutional indicators, followed by normative isomorphism, while mimetic isomorphism is less evident. The independence of the regulator is the most affected indicator by decoupling. Furthermore, the most frequent instances of decoupling arise from contradictions between coercive and normative pressures, typically resulting in the dominance of coercive forces.