Ports are central in global trade, with 90 percent of goods transported by sea. Since the 1990s, global liberalization has standardized port governance, positioning port authorities as independent agencies overseeing port spaces through public tenders. Despite these agencies’ critical role, they are seldom the subject of regulatory studies. The present article investigates the case of regulatory capture in Italian port authorities, which were first established in 1994 (and restructured in 2016). Italy’s maritime trade is characterized by high port density and overlapping catchment areas served by few market actors, often vertically integrated. This creates an oligopsony in terminal space allocation, where port authorities face pressures from carriers and terminal operators, raising regulatory capture risks. Empirically, the study explores the contrasting trajectories of Genoa and Trieste in 2015-2024. Despite similar governance contexts, Genoa succumbed to regulatory capture, while Trieste’s success is linked to depoliticized agency and a focus on economic development.
