Reducing Complexity, not Reproducing it: Mapping Variance in Cyber State Posture

Cyberspace is a new domain of state security competition that differs from the conventional and nuclear realms. The unique scope condition of cyberspace is that states are constantly engaged in prolonged cyberspace operations (COs) below the threshold of armed attack. This introduces complexity, inclining many scholars to use new approaches, both in theory and for empirical projects, to grasp state behaviour in cyberspace. However, this often results in the re-production of this complexity, instead of its reduction, which is an important step to a better understanding of the new domain. This paper argues that two dimensions of classical security studies literature suffices to grasp variance in cyber state behaviour: High or low capability and offensive or defensive doctrine. Building on this, it proposes a typology of “cyber postures”: Interventionists (high/offensive), Troublemakers (low/offensive), Castle-builders (high/defensive) and Start-ups (low/defensive). Based on a parsimonious operationalization of capabilities and doctrine, using qualitative and quantitative measures, the paper maps 30 states engaged in the security competition in cyberspace. The resulting topography of cyber state behaviour is the basis for further explanatory analysis. It contributes to the literature by providing a parsimonious, yet sufficiently thorough approach to measuring cyber state behaviour, that sets a counterpoint to the prevailing “cyber exceptionalism”.