With the growth of the regulatory state and the expansion of regulatory agencies globally, Iran is also experiencing a shift in its public sector towards regulatory governance. Until 2000, the government's extensive and direct involvement in service provision meant that regulation was not a central focus. However, since 2000, a series of reforms has ushered in a new phase of regulatory development. Among the most notable of these initiatives are the privatization of the telecommunications sector and the establishment of the Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA) in 2002.
Over two decades have passed since the early efforts to establish a regulatory state in Iran, and an overview of the current regulatory landscape reveals a range of challenges. A key issue is the need for many regulatory agencies to achieve greater independence from government influence, which often impedes their ability to make specialized, non-political, and autonomous decisions. While independence is a vital characteristic for effective regulators, achieving it remains a complex and challenging task. In Iran, where government intervention in the economy has deep historical roots, simply including provisions for independence in regulatory statutes does not guarantee operational autonomy. As a result, evaluating the formal independence of regulators is insufficient. It is also crucial to examine their informal independence and actual practices to gain a more complete understanding of the situation. To provide a comprehensive picture of the regulatory agencies' independence, this research evaluates both the de jure and de facto independence of the Communications Regulatory Authority. This article uses Gilardi's model to assess the de jure independence of the CRA, while applying social network analysis to measure its de facto independence and assess the influence of other actors, such as policymakers, co-regulators, and regulatees, on the agency's operational independence.
