Threatened Democracy, Threatened Leaders: The Role of Nationality and Political Orientation in Shaping Legitimization of Violence Against Political Leaders

How does democratic backsliding shapes public attitudes towards legitimizing violence against their own political leaderships? While research mainly focuses on political violence in the intergroup context, the conditions under which violent extremism is shaped and projected towards ingroup leaders requires a closer examination. Moreover, due to structural and methodological shortcomings, a clear distinction between the legitimization of violence and actual willingness to participate in violent acts against political leaders requires a more accurate measurement and definition. In a longitudinal study conducted in Israel among representative samples of both Jewish- and Arab Israelis, we have examined how democratic backsliding interacts with nationality and political orientation in shaping attitudes and behavioral intentions towards violence against politicians. Data were collected at two time points—before (N=2008) and after (N=1957) a series of government decisions reducing democratic checks and balances. We analyzed how different group settings influence the legitimization of violence against politicians as well as personal willingness to engage in such acts of violent extremism. Our large, diverse sample ensured robust generalizability without oversampling subgroups. Findings reveal several different trends in the increasingly polarized Israeli society. First, an overall increase in the legitimization of violence against political leaders was established during periods of democratic backsliding. Furthermore, significantly stronger effects were observed among Arab, compared to Jewish, citizens, suggesting different levels and trajectories of endorsing violence between ethnic majorities and minorities in the superordinate ingroup. Second, shifting the focus from nationality to political orientation among Jewish Israelis, leftists showed consistent trends of increased legitimization of violence against political leaders, whereas rightist respondents exhibited no significant changes, corresponding with contemporary literature on the implications of affective polarization on public perceptions of violence. Lastly, no significant effects emerged for personal willingness to engage in political violence, illustrating the stark difference between attitudinal and behavioral responses to external stimuli. This study's findings contribute to the broader understanding of how democratic backsliding interacts with social identity, highlighting its critical role in shaping affective polarization, political extremism and violent tendencies during intractable conflicts. Keywords: Political Violence, Extremism, Democratic Backsliding, Affective Polarization