Window-Dressing or Real Reform?: Compliance with PACE Reforms in Jordan and Morocco

This paper examines the comparative compliance of Jordan and Morocco with political reforms under the “Partner for Democracy” status granted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). Against the backdrop of increasing international parliamentary institutions (IPIs) aimed at promoting democratic norms, PACE stands out as a significant actor in consolidating democratic ideals. In 2011 and 2016, Morocco and Jordan, respectively, became Partners for Democracy. This status, offered within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy and OSCE cooperation, sought to encourage political reforms across four key areas: electoral systems, gender parity, civil society engagement, and adherence to the rule of law. Both countries, however, display autocratic tendencies, including suppression of freedoms, regime entrenchment, and limited political space for citizens. Autocratic regimes often join international organizations to bolster their legitimacy through external cooperation while using such platforms for symbolic “window-dressing.” Despite this, PACE's efforts present a unique opportunity for democratic advancement through external oversight and support mechanisms. The study employs a most-similar case design to explore the differing levels of reform compliance in Morocco and Jordan. It probes whether external pressures from PACE, combined with internal sociopolitical challenges such as protests, state crackdowns, and socioeconomic inequalities, can drive meaningful reform. While both nations operate under similar conditions of political constraint, their responses to PACE's prescribed reforms reveal distinct patterns of adherence and resistance. The analysis highlights the challenges and limitations of democratic norm dissemination within autocratic settings. It argues that while external mechanisms like the Partner for Democracy status create opportunities for collaboration and reform, their effectiveness is constrained by domestic political realities. Morocco demonstrates more substantial progress in areas such as gender parity and civil society reforms, attributed to a combination of external incentives and relatively greater internal pressure. Conversely, Jordan exhibits slower and less consistent compliance, hindered by entrenched regime control and limited political will. This paper contributes to understanding how IPIs can engage autocratic regimes and foster democratic norms despite their inherent resistance. It underscores the importance of considering both external and internal factors in assessing the effectiveness of reform initiatives. Furthermore, it reflects on the paradox of autocracies engaging with international democratic institutions: while such engagement can signal legitimacy and cooperation, it often falls short of producing substantive democratic transformation.