The 2024 French legislative elections were marked by an extraordinary set of circumstances: triggered by a presidential dissolution of the National Assembly, the elections led to a historically fragmented parliament, split into three ideologically polarized blocs—left, center, and radical right. This electoral outcome, shaped by an unexpected re-emergence of the “Republican Front” (a cordon sanitaire of left and centrist parties aimed at blocking the Rassemblement National (RN) in the second round), presents a unique case for studying patterns of negative voting. While negative voting—casting a ballot against a candidate or party rather than for a preferred option—has been widely studied in multiparty contexts, this election provides a rare opportunity to examine the phenomenon under the influence of explicit party-driven strategic withdrawal and negative voting instructions.
In two-round majoritarian systems, negative voting is often complex, as voters may face diverging second-round scenarios with more than two candidates. Notably, in 2024, left and centrist candidates almost systematically withdrew when poorly placed to advance the Republican Front, thereby encouraging voters to support an ideologically opposed candidate against the RN. In this context, we investigate whether voters adhered to these strategic instructions, and whether the effect varied across ideological blocs and voter profiles. Specifically, we ask: to what extent did left and centrist voters comply with calls for moral negative voting? Which individual-level characteristics explain defection from these voting instructions? How did RN voters respond to this unprecedented coalition?
Using data from the Enquête Electorale Française (EnEF) panel study, which includes multiple waves fielded throughout the election cycle, we find that non-RN voters largely followed the Republican Front logic, including highly ideologically polarized individuals. Conversely, RN voters exhibited demobilization between rounds. These findings contribute to the growing literature on affective polarization and negative voting by demonstrating how party-driven negative voting strategies can influence voter behavior – even in highly (ideologically) polarized elections.
