Democratic Self-Defence and Heightened Geopolitical Threats. The Rise of Defensive Democracies in Eastern Europe

So far, democratic self-defence has been primarily analysed in domestic political settings. However, the heightened geopolitical tensions in Europe (particularly the war in Ukraine) force scholars to pay more attention to geopolitics and national security. The current paper attempts to re-conceptualise the notion of "defensive democracy" while analysing it in the Eastern European context, focusing predominantly on the Baltic States – the countries bordering Russia, having a large Russian minority, and in which the war in Ukraine has already led to the restrictions of some democratic freedoms. The notion of defensive democracy is not entirely new; it has been the official ideology in Israel since the 1980s and, thus, has been somewhat theorised by Israeli scholars previously (e.g., Weinblum, 2015). However, the current paper attempts (1) to re-conceptualise the notion while enlarging its empirical and theoretical scope (bringing in Eastern Europe), (2) demonstrating its empirical applicability (the Baltic experience), and (3) further discussing its impact on the quality of democracy, particularly in the context of raising (right-wing) populism. The paper defines defensive democracy as a rare form of contemporary democracy that prioritises existential and national security over democratic rights and liberties, but while doing so, it still adheres to the core principles of democracy. In its very essence, the doctrine asserts that in order to preserve the country's very existence and the democratic system itself, it may be necessary to curtail certain democratic freedoms and rights on some occasions. The paper further conceptualises defensive democracies through three distinct traits. First, under defensive democracies, core freedoms and rights are safeguarded for most citizens; however, special restrictions may be imposed on specific societal groups depending on national security considerations. In the Baltic context, that "specific group" is obviously the Russian-speaking minority. Second, under defensive democracy, the very existence of the country and democratic order is depicted as being under constant threat, and the securitisation of various policy areas and societal domains gradually becomes a new normality. In the Baltic States, one can already witness the progressive securitisation of different policy areas (energy, memory, etc.), negatively affecting the quality of open, democratic public debates. Third, in public discourse, individuals are often divided into loyal and patriotic citizens, "suspicious citizens," and outright enemies. The described discoursive tendencies are already evident in the Baltic States, considering the citizens' supposed attitudes to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The paper will also discuss how those three features may affect the overall democratic quality. The rise of (right-wing) populism will be specifically considered here, and the paper argues that "defensive democracy" is like a "double-edged sword" for the populists: it can considerably boost their ambitions but also clip their wings, depending on the specific conditions. The paper may fit the best in Panel 2 following its description quite closely: (1) it talks about a specific region, (2) introduces a novel approach to democratic self-defence, and (3) links it with empirical evidence.