Hybrid Threats and the Ambiguation of Liberal Norms

Hybrid threats pose a new strategic grey zone as they walk the line between war and peace, increasingly questioning the normative foundations of the Liberal International Order (LIO). Recent findings suggest that threat actors can strategically widen the zone between peace and warfare by using a hybrid mixture of instruments. Research also proposes that the underlying strategy of hybrid threats is the production of ambiguity. The claim is that autocratic actors such as Russia und China strategically produce ambiguity – leaving their targets in a cognitive impasse about their political, strategic, and tactical intentions. This situation, characterized by differing knowledge of aggressor and target, forces the target to disperse its resources and enables the aggressor to promote their disruptive political agenda. Puzzling for us are the implications of this threat relationship characterized by differing states of knowledge for international relations and international norms. While some researchers suggest an erosion of norms resulting from hybrid practices, we expect a deeper incision into liberal norms and the LIO, by proposing the concept of ambiguation of international norms and relations. With the concept of strategic ambiguation, we are differentiating ourselves from both norm contestation and norm antipreneurs. Research on norm contestation assumes that a liberal norm entrepreneur promotes liberal norms which are then contested by other liberal actors, resulting in a life cycle of liberal norms. However, an inherent liberal bias inhibits researchers from capturing norm contestation by autocratic actors. The notion of norm anitpreneurs introduces strategic norm promotion by actors outside the liberal norm community. In contrast, ambiguation does not serve the strategic promotion of illiberal or autocratic norms. Rather, we hypothesize that by using ambiguity to achieve political goals, autocratic states opportunistically invoke the perception of norm antipreneurship without promoting autocratic alternatives. As a proof of concept, we will study the opportunistic use of Russian R2P during their hybrid practices between 2008 and 2022 in the Russian near abroad, while still supporting or least tolerating a liberal interpretation of R2P until 2011 in the international arena. Russian R2P not only competed with the Western interpretations of sovereignty, but also highlights a paradoxical (or ambiguous) Russian interpretation between strict state sovereignty and limited sovereignty inside what Russia perceives as a sphere of influence. We operationalize ambiguity through the dimensions of complexity and deniability in both speech and action. For complexity, we expect to observe a diverse mixture of cooperative and conflictive actions towards their targets. At the same time, we expect to see a diverse notion of R2P in their language at official forums like the United Nations, referring to the concept with widely different and incompatible interpretations of their meaning and their relation to other core norms like sovereignty. For deniability, we expect to see the use of proxy actors during their offensive actions and a denial of any relationship in speech. Our study will show how Russian hybrid practices are preventing immediate handling of the Russian aggression as a direct breach of international law, resulting in ambiguation of international norms.