Extensive empirical evidence points to a `personalization of politics' in parliamentary democracies. However, existing research has not explored whether the personalization of politics has affected the way in which voters hold parliamentary governments accountable and whether together with a personalization of politics accountability has likewise become more personalized. This study argues that in the course of increasing personalization, individual members of cabinet in parliamentary governments are perceived as more responsible for overall government and economic performance by voters. It moreover argues that because of the simultaneous `presidentialization of politics' it is prime ministers in particular that voters increasingly perceive to be responsible for overall government and economic performance. Whether accountability in parliamentary government has presidentialized to a greater extent than it has personalized will be empirically investigated. The paper further investigates whether such a presidentialization of accountability has led to greater electoral accountability for governments led by long-reigning prime ministers over time. Using electoral survey data on West European democracies over several decades, as well as aggregate data on election returns and economic performance data from parliamentary elections around the world, this paper investigates whether voters' evaluation of cabinet ministers and prime ministers progressively depends on overall government and economic performance.
