Many studies have analysed the various effects arising from changes in the design of the quotas, including their impact on the number of women nominated or elected (Dahlerup, 2007; Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2010; Norris & Lovenduski, 1993). Many of these have focus on comparing regions or analysing national politics. However, new studies have shown that the existence of a federal regime modifies the structure in which this particular institution works within a single country (Meir, 2004; Vickers, 2010, 2011, 2012; Zetterberg, 2008). These have argued that the possible consequences emerging from a federal organisation have the potential of increasing the level of complexity regarding the design and operation of quotas.
In Mexico, the renewed federal regime has allowed the existence of different share of quotas across states. Additionally, the differences extent to issues revolving around enforcement mechanisms, including mandate positioning, the type of candidacies the quota applies to, amongst others. This paper analyses the effects of quotas on the percentage of women nominated and elected in Mexican states, paying close attention to the differences between the institutional designs of quotas and other related aspects. The paper suggests that there are minimal differences caused by certain levels of variation in the quota percentage. However, it suggests that the main gap among women nominated and elected across states can be explained by the other mechanisms that have been added recently to the quota, such as mandatory positioning within proportional representation lists and the application of the quota to all nominations regardless of the position within the joint ticket nomination system used in Mexico. The analysis is based on new aggregated data collated during fieldwork. It includes data on the nomination and election of women in a sample of states’ elections covering the period of 1998 to 2010.
