Does the Intensifying “Brussels Blaming Game” Affect Implementation of EU Policies? The Case of Opposition to the Green Deal in the Czech Republic

Similar to other post-communist Member States, certain factions of the Czech political representation quickly found it expedient to use “Brussels” as a scapegoat for various negative domestic developments, which has heavily contributed to transforming the Czech public into one of the most Eurosceptic societies in the EU. Yet, all governments, including those led by the populist political party ANO, have been quite cooperative at the EU level and have diligently implemented all EU legal acts into domestic legal order without much ado. The balancing duality between “rhetoric and deeds” seems to be one of the major factors why Czechia has not joined the ever-increasing group of democratic backsliding CEE states. The first part of the equation—the “Brussels Blaming Game”—has recently intensified noticeably. With rising energy prices and a looming crisis in the automotive sector, the Green Deal quickly became the prime target of public ire from politicians. During the latest European Parliament election campaign, all major political parties depicted the Green Deal as an intentional effort to deindustrialize Czechia and destroy its economy, either rejecting it outright or calling for its major revision. This strategy brought quick results: the newly established party "Motorists Unite" ranked third in the elections, and the winning populist movement ANO left the pro-integration political group Renew for the newly established Patriots for Europe group to confirm its sudden Eurosceptic pedigree. The aim of my contribution is to inquire whether the intensifying critique of the Green Deal has also changed the strategy of political parties regarding the implementation of EU obligations. This goal will be achieved on two levels: 1) By conducting content analysis of MPs’ speeches in the Czech House of Deputies—do they repeat or moderate their often-absurd claims from media or social networks during plenary debates? 2) By examining how the level of discretion in EU legal acts is exploited or even violated by the Czech legislator—is the negative attitude toward the Green Deal reflected in corresponding domestic legislation? Are there distinctions between the positions of government and opposition parties? The paper’s results have important implications. First, if the “Blaming Game” is mirrored in the implementation of EU policies, the Czech political representation, supported by an uninformed and manipulated wider public, may join Slovakia and Hungary in embarking on a journey of open conflict with the EU, further complicating the functioning of the organization in these challenging times. Second, potential Czech resistance to the Green Deal may be replicated in other similarly affected countries, such as Poland or Romania, endangering the future of this key EU project. Note: Proposal would be fit to panel "The European Green Deal in Central and Eastern Europe: strategies, actors, first results"