Being Friends or Being Favored? The Drivers of Interest Group Trust in Regulatory Agencies

Interest groups fulfill an important role in the well-functioning of modern regulatory regimes. Traditionally, regulation was a state-activity performed in a strictly hierarchical relation. However, by delegating regulatory power to regulatory agencies, states wanted to ensure continuity in highly complex policy fields. These agencies now serve as a venue for exchanging and sharing expert information to create effective and objective regulation. Trust between interest groups and regulators is crucial for this cooperation. Interest groups are more likely to share information, indicate malfunctioning regulation, and report non-compliance if trust exists. Despite its importance, the drivers of interest groups' trust in regulators remain underexplored. This paper examines two perspectives: a relational view emphasizing factors such as contacts, information exchanges, and transparency, and an alternative output-based view where trust depends on the alignment of regulatory outcomes with interest group preferences. By analyzing these factors, the paper seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of what drives trust and its implications for effective regulatory governance.