What Explains the Absence of Official Memory in Post-Conflict States? Narrative Rivalry in Nepal, 2006–2024

Memory building is a crucial task for post-conflict governments to reconcile conflicting identities and narratives after violent conflict. Institutionalized means, such as memory laws, commemorative practices, and history education, are often implemented to serve this purpose. However, what explains the absence of such official memory in some post-conflict states? This article argues that such silence results from a 'Narrative Rivalry,' a political deadlock driven by the high political risk perception of ruling elites and the strong capacity of bottom-up actors—such as civil society organizations, victims' groups, academics, and media—to produce alternative narratives. Post-conflict elites primarily seek to sustain their political legitimacy and survival by filtering out narratives that could threaten their governance. However, such efforts are often contested by the pressures of bottom-up actors when their vigorous activities are enabled by permissive legal and structural conditions. This interplay between these two mnemonic actors creates a competitive memory landscape, preventing both the unilateral institutionalization of conflict remembrance and the convergence of conflicting narratives. This article uses post-conflict Nepal (2006–2024) as a case study, and the empirical analysis draws on data collected during a two-month fieldwork. It demonstrates how a power-sharing agreement between the Nepali government and the Maoists facilitated political reconciliation among former warring parties but obstructed the pursuit of transitional justice and collective memory-building. Bottom-up actors have successfully and collectively tackled this through informal remembrance as a means of resistance. This highlights the tensions between these opposing forces and the absence of official memorialization as a result.