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Banning of Political Parties in South America: A Viable Tool?

Constitutions
Democracy
Extremism
Latin America
Rule of Law
Gabriel Pinho Brochado
University of São Paulo
Gabriel Pinho Brochado
University of São Paulo

Abstract

This paper aims to assess legal provisions related to banning political parties in South America, specifically focusing on the institutionalization of militant democracy. Party bans are one of the most classical and controversial measures in militant democracy. Despite these measures being widely discussed in European contexts due to their application by constitutional courts, in South America, where democratic traditions are more recent and political instability has often taken the form of coups, the institutionalization and application of party bans remain underexplored. How are such measures institutionalized in South American democracies? Why, although party bans play a central role in militant democracy, are they less commonly applied in this region? The study is motivated by contemporary democratic erosion in the region, where anti-democratic parties and leaders, such as Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Javier Milei in Argentina, attain power through non-violent means, gradually undermining democratic values. By adopting the categorization of party bans proposed by Angela Bourne and Fernando Bértoa, specifically non-registration and dissolution, the paper aims to identify the presence or absence of these legal measures across South American countries. Using a comparative descriptive methodology, the study investigates constitutional and legislative provisions in South American countries to assess the extent of militant democracy institutionalization in the region. Key aspects analyzed include whether the bans, when present, target specific ideologies or parties (negative republicanism), the democratic elements protected by these provisions, their constitutional embedding, and the designated actors responsible for their enforcement. The analysis suggests that conjectural elements have rendered the banning of parties an exceptional measure, with institutions resorting to alternative measures of militant democracy to safeguard the regime. Preliminary results reveal varying degrees of institutionalization and highlight the crucial role of specific legal frameworks in safeguarding democratic values. Nevertheless, they differ from those observed in similar situations in Europe and other regions analyzed by literature. This comparative analysis provides evidence of the regional institutionalization of militant democracy and offers insights into the effectiveness of specific and regionally adapted legal measures in preserving democratic values. This paper contributes to the broader discourse on liberal democracy self-protection. It emphasizes the need for more region-specific case studies to account for differences between the South and the North.