Deliberative Journalism: the Press as a Publicly Reasoning Institution

Despite the immense literature on deliberative theory and the recent ‘institutional turn’ within it, deliberative theorists have said so far quite little about the role that the press should play within a deliberative democracy. This article explores that question, developing a deliberative theory of journalism according to which the press should work as a publicly reasoning institution. Section 1 introduces three conceptual remarks on the nature of the press as an institution of democracy. First, social institutions, including the press, are sets of norms that define roles—that is, institutional rights and obligations—which serve to coordinate people and thereby to efficiently fulfill the institution’s raison d’être. Second, an institution’s raison d’être might be specified to different degrees, which allows us to distinguish between the general concept of an institution, as defined by raison d’être in general terms, and its different conceptions, each one defined by a more specific formulation of the institution’s raison d’être. Finally, I distinguish between the ‘type’ (or ideal) of an institution, as defined by its raison d’être, and the ‘token’ institutions, i.e., the agents incarnating that ideal within spatial-temporal contexts. Section 2 sketches an ecumenical ideal of deliberative democracy, which I define as a normative model of political decision making according to which political decisions should be preceded by, and taken in accordance with, a process of democratic deliberation in which all citizens participate as free and equal persons. Drawing on this ideal, section 3 develops a deliberative theory of the press. In this view, I hold, the press’ raison d’être is to seek, select, and report the information that would best equipe citizens to engage in high-quality democratic deliberation. I show how this account of journalism aligns with the views of deliberative scholars, such as Habermas or Sunstein. To further clarify the ideal of the press as a publicly reasoning institution, I then explicate and justify three duties that bear upon deliberative journalists: (i) the duty of gatekeeping, (ii) the duty to explain, (iii) and the duty of engaging in public criticism. Other functions typically assigned to the press, such as calling for mobilization or group advocacy, are—or so I argue—either not the press’ or just subsidiary functions that deliberative journalists should fulfill only insofar doing so contributes to the main one, which is promoting deliberation. To further illuminate the ideal of the press as a publicly reasoning institution, section 4 contrasts it with other normative accounts of journalism and of the press, including: (i) the ideal of objective reporting, (ii) the partisan model of the press, (iii) the commercial model of the press, (iv) the ideal of watchdog journalism, and (v) the civic (or public) journalism movement. Section 5 defends the deliberative ideal of the press as a publicly reasoning institution by defending it against the accusations of being (i) at odds with free speech, (ii) too vague (or too narrow) an ideal, (iii) excessively rationalistic, (iv) at odds with neutrality, and (v) impracticable.