How Should We Use ‘Moralized’ Concepts in Political Theory?

This paper addresses the question of how so-called ‘moralized’ concepts are to be understood and deployed in political theory. It examines the ways in which certain concepts transition from being treated as purely descriptive to becoming embedded with normative and moral significance, focusing on the notion of ‘feasibility’ as a running example. Feasibiity, invoked in discussions about justice, democracy, and other normative ideals, is frequently assumed to operate as a constraint on what is practically achievable. However, its empirical character has been challenged by theorists who argue that feasibility is inherently value-laden and shaped by normative considerations. The paper studies these attempts with the aim of investigating the conditions under which concepts such as ‘feasibility’ undergoes moralization, analyzing how theorists justify this shift and the implications it carries for normative theorizing. By situating the discussion within broader debates on the interplay between empirical realities and normative ideals, the paper critically evaluates whether the moralization of notions such as feasibility enriches or undermines their role in political theory. It explores the potential risks of adopting a moralized notion of feasibility, including the possibility of conflating normative ideals with empirical constraints, which can obscure the practical limits of political action. This conflation risks overburdening normative theorizing with unrealistic expectations or, conversely, narrowing the scope of normative ideals to align too closely with the status quo. It is argued that a descriptive notion of feasibility offers the advantage of maintaining a clearer distinction between empirical constraints and normative aspirations, enabling theorists to better evaluate the gap between what is and what ought to be. It is also stressed that it is important to contantly continue to critically interrogate the values embedded within supposedly neutral empirical concepts. The paper concludes by considering the broader implications of this argument for political theory, emphasizing the need for greater clarity and rigor in distinguishing empirical from moralized dimensions of key political concepts.