Authoritarian Commitments to Independent International Courts?

International law and courts are at the cornerstone of contemporary global governance. From proliferation to backlash, international courts have gained increased attention in recent years. One important dynamic of international courts however has escaped close examination. Specifically, as the number of courts has increased over time, the degree of formal judicial independence has declined. This paper explores the parallel delegation of authority to international courts alongside a reluctance to relinquish control over these institutions. Using original data on formal independence, the paper explores the factors that determine judicial independence. Specifically, it considers how democracies, new and old, as well as authoritarian regimes rely differently on formal independence to signal the credible commitments. The paper suggests that international courts whose member states are mostly authoritarian and have weak commitment to domestic judicial independence are more inclined to imbue international courts with formal independence. These findings have implications for debates over backlash and resistance against international courts as well as the authoritarian international law. Namely, as authoritarian international courts enjoy more formal independence, they may rely more on informal channels of subversion and extraordinary modes of resistance.