Agricultural Policy Making in Norway: A Balancing Act Between New Demands and Established Ideas

The Norwegian political science literature on domestic agricultural policy making has emphasised its uniqueness and its stability (Farsund, 2004; Vik, 2020). However, this policy area has since the late 1980s and early 1990s been under constant pressure for change. Partly as a consequence of international agreements Norway have signed, and partly following from changing national political trends. In addition, the industry has at times faced political majorities that have wanted lower cost for taxpayers and lower prices for consumers. Nevertheless, the institutional framework for policy formulation and implementation is more or less the same as when the policy area was institutionalized around 1950. This is not least due to the fact that system for agricultural policy making, and the idea that farmers should have the same income and welfare levels as other groups, has broad support in the population and most political parties. Nevertheless, through the layering and conversion of policy instruments, the adoption and incorporation of novel ideas, and integration of new policy areas, the agricultural policy is considerably changed (Melås et al., 2024; Skagen & Boasson, 2024). This paper investigates how this policy durability is a result of ideational and institutional bricolage of incumbent actors (Carstensen and Röper, 2024). In order for stability to endure in terms of privileged access to decision-making arenas, substantial governmental support, and favourable environmental schemes, the agricultural sector has deployed strategies that ameliorate external pressure, while limiting the impact on status quo. The article also hypothesizes that there is a built-in threat towards the exceptional institutional structure that generates this seemingly contradictory process of concurring change and stability. Politicians have from the outset favoured an institutional framework which allows for shared responsibility between agricultural interests and the government as this forces the agricultural actors to partake in ‘practices of dynamic order’ (Jabko & Sheingate, 2018) to uphold the advantageous institutional setup. We investigate this through cases of trade, environment, and climate change with data from previous studies, documents and interviews