Why the Sanctions Have Not (Yet) Stopped the War in Ukraine

The Western sanctions—likely the harshest in history—have not yet succeeded in ending Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. We apply a unified theoretical framework to explain why. Economic sanctions could potentially end the invasion through three pathways: coercion, constraining, or regime change. We argue that, while differing in important respects, these pathways share a key condition: To succeed, the sanctions must not only be very severe; they must convince Putin that he, prior to the invasion, seriously underestimated their adverse impact on Russia’s economy, on his war machine, or on his grip on power. So far, however, none of these adverse impacts of the sanctions regime seem to have significantly exceeded Putin’s expectations. Despite severe losses, his forces have continued to advance in Eastern Ukraine. And while the ruble has crumbled and inflation has soared, the Russian economy has been outgrowing those of most Western countries. Finally, large segments of the Russian population have enjoyed substantial wage increases and remain supportive of their president. The paper concludes by (1) considering why the sanctions have been upheld and expanded despite failing to bring about the desired policy change and (2) providing recommendations for enhancing the sanctions' effectiveness.