What Role Do Emotions Play in the Public Justification Process? An Emotionalist Interpretation of Public Justification

Public justification defines when the exercise of (both moral and political) authority is justified. The predominant approach to public justification at least partially idealizes the agents involved, assuming certain conditions that those justifying the exercise of authority—and those to whom it is justified—should meet. Typically, these conditions include a certain level of rationality and reasonableness. One significant issue with public justification is its tendency to almost completely ignore the role of emotions in the process of justification. Gerald Gaus is one of the few authors who considers emotions in this context. Drawing on Strawson’s concept of reactive attitudes, Gaus seeks to incorporate these emotional responses into the predominantly rationalist framework of public justification. However, despite his efforts, Gaus’s conception remains heavily influenced by the Kantian—thus rationalistic—principle of moral autonomy as the foundation for public justification. In my paper, I aim to analyze the relationship between agents in the public justification process through the lens of an emotionalist interpretation. Specifically, building on the moral arguments of authors such as Michael Stocker, Bernard Williams, Shaun Nichols, and Martha Nussbaum, I emphasize that our relationships with others are deeply shaped by sentiments and emotions. These affect public justification as an integral part of our interactions with others. Ignoring the impact of emotions misrepresents the nature of our moral psychology, which fundamentally influences the justification of authority. In this paper, I examine how emotions shape interpersonal relations that, in turn, determine the character of public justification. I also analyze the role emotions play during the justification process itself.