AI and Procedural Guarantees in the European Court of Human Rights

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and other digital technologies in judicial systems has sparked noteworthy debate about their potential to disrupt longstanding legal principles. While these tools promise efficiency and precision, their application raises questions about fairness, transparency, and trust in justice. This presentation explores these issues through a case study of the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in Sigurður Einarsson and Others v. Iceland (2019). This case involves the use of an advanced e-discovery system in a high-profile financial criminal investigation. At the heart of the case was the use of Clearwell, an AI-powered e-discovery tool, which enabled the prosecution to sift through voluminous data. While the technology improved efficiency, the applicants argued that it created an unequal playing field. They were denied similar access to the full dataset and the ability to deploy equivalent technological tools, thus violating the principle of equality of arms and limiting their capacity to prepare a robust defence. This asymmetry raises broader questions about the procedural safeguards necessary when courts adopt AI or other advanced digital tools. Notably, a search on the HUDOC platform reveals that only one case explicitly relates to AI, something that highlights the relative novelty of the topic in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. As such, it is argued, there is an urgent need for scholarly and judicial engagement with the challenges AI poses to fundamental procedural rights. The hypothesis underpinning this analysis is that, while AI can enhance the efficiency of judicial processes, its inequitable or unregulated application risks undermining procedural guarantees and public trust in justice systems. Specifically, the study hypothesises that the European Court of Human Rights' focus on fairness and equality in procedural rights provides a vital framework for addressing these challenges. Through an examination of the Court’s reasoning and its emphasis on transparency and access, this presentation explores how existing legal principles can guide the integration of AI in justice systems. This paper aims at building on the Sigurður Einarsson case, by means of focusing into broader concerns about the implications of AI’s opacity (“black-box” decisions), the potential for bias, and the risk of eroding public confidence in judicial impartiality. At the same time, it recognises the significant advantages of AI, such as managing evidence and reducing case backlogs, and outright rejection of technology is neither feasible nor desirable.