Is It Fair? A Theoretical Framework to Analyse and Assess Justifications of Social Inequalities in Liberal Democracies

How do political elites justify social inequalities in liberal democracies? Are their justifications defensible from the liberal perspective Western democracies adhere to? As the gap between the rich and the poor widens, inequality poses a relevant challenge to legitimation efforts in liberal democracies. In this context, liberal theories of distributive justice provide principles and parameters to assess to what extent social inequalities are defensible and why. However, they can address that task in many different and sometimes seemly contradictory ways. Up to now, researchers dedicated to qualitatively examining justifications of inequalities in political rhetoric have had to choose between embracing one specific theory of distributive justice¬ or engaging as little as possible with available normative theories. With the first approach, researchers need to deal with the fact that disagreement is expected in liberal societies; politicians and people in general are not constraint to abide by any specific theory of distributive justice, and thus, the adoption of a single theoretical position may prove to be too limited to cover all the different ways distributive issues are addressed. For that reason, the second approach might seem to be a safer choice, but it also comes with a price: it forgoes the solid normative foundations on which well-established theories of justice sit. Consequently, qualitative studies that adopt this approach develop weaker and simpler theories from the bottom up, which end up being more descriptive in nature and lacking the power to put forward independent standards to assess the adequacy and rightness of political rhetoric from a normative perspective. In this paper, I propose to open a third path, benefitting empirical researchers who wish to take full advantage of the rich and diversified knowledge accumulated in the field of political theory. The paper aims at comprehensively mapping out the justificatory claims of distribution in well-established liberal theories of justice. It organises forty-four justificatory claims into six conceptual cornerstones, which are at the core of liberalism: (1) rational and responsible individuals, (2) people’s moral worth, (3) freedom to choose and respect to people’s decisions, (4) fair and equal treatment, (5) market economy, and (6) legitimate government. Additionally, the paper argues for a differentiation between weaker and stronger justificatory claims based on a threshold of consistency, impartiality, and adherence to recognised empirical knowledge. Although extensive, this framework is limited to the liberal landscape and does not cover other ideological perspectives. Still, insofar as Western liberal democracies are concerned, it can contribute to the operationalisation of normative analyses of the political rhetoric on social inequalities and, at the same time, it offers clear parameters to evaluate to what extent this rhetoric lives up to liberal standards.