Virtue Ethics for Political Realists

The paper begins by addressing the scepticism of political realists regarding the integration of moral norms into normative political theory. Realists tend to conceptualise morality as an axiomatic form of ethical reasoning, characterised by definitive principles and conclusive guidelines, which they view as instrumental rather than inherently valuable. To avoid falling into dogmatism, realists argue that morality must be "filtered" through political considerations (Jubb 2019). However, if we accept that no reasonable political thought can be sustained without fundamental moral premises (Erman and Möller, 2024, p. 10) – and I agree that we should – the challenge remains: how can ethics be integrated into political theory without either moralising politics or politicising morality? This paper proposes that the answer lies in a non-axiomatic perspective on morality, specifically, within contemporary virtue ethics and its engagement with epistemic practice. Instead of starting with fixed principles that demand ideal conditions for their application, virtue ethics emphasises an appropriate response to the complexities of reality, characterised by indeterminacy and persistent disagreement. Consequently, this paper examines how virtue ethics aligns with political realism by providing a justificatory framework that explains why and how virtue reasoning establishes certain moral principles as foundational, while remaining sensitive to the complexities of social and political life.