Ethnic, Liberal, and Strategic Voters in Divided Societies. Analysing Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Daniel Bochsler, Central European University (CEU) and University of Belgrade What determines voting behaviour in ethnically divided societies? This paper complements the prevalent idea that elections resort to ethnic censuses with two alternative models of choice. In contrast to „ethnic voters“, “liberal voters” make a political choice, based on their issue preferences, party profiles, and election campaigns, whereas “strategic voters” consider the specific opportunities and incentives of elections in ethnically heterogeneous societies. The menu of election strategies in elections in heterogeneous societies, which often involve reserve seats or quotas for ethnic groups, is much more multi-faceted than in common elections. I scrutinise these three explanations at the example of presidential elections in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This federal entity is also the electoral district for the election of the Bosniak and the Croat seat of the presidency, and voters decide whether to vote for ingroup candidate or outgroup candidates. Alleged strategic intergroup voting in the presidential elections has caused a constitutional and diplomatic crisis, but whether and why voters vote across ethnic lines has not been examined up to day. Empirically, this study relies on electoral results from simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, covering 3100 precincts.