The De-Russification of Cyprus and the Truman Doctrine Analogy: a Small American Trophy in Times of Great Challenges

In the contemporary geopolitical landscape, Cyprus emerges as an interesting focal point of the United States' post-2017 strategic reorientation, reflecting similarities to the historical context of the Truman Doctrine during the early Cold War era. This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of two distinct periods of U.S. foreign policy: U.S. aid to Greece under the Truman Doctrine's inception in 1947, which established a precedent for American interventionism under the guise of supporting allies against Soviet encroachment, and the post-2017 reconfiguration of U.S. national security strategy and its implications in U.S. Eastern Mediterranean policy, particularly concerning the de-Russification of Cyprus. The study comparatively explores the interplay between shifting perceptions of polarity, great power threats, domino-effect narratives, balancing strategies among great powers, and modes of U.S. support for allies at risk. The paper draws from neorealist and necolassical realist theoretical pools. By adopting a critically methodological perspective, the research not only identifies methodological commonalities but also addresses the inherent limitations of these analogies, aiming to re-evaluate existing theoretical and methodological tools. Key parallels are drawn between U.S. aid to Greece in the aftermath of World War II and contemporary U.S. policies aimed at diminishing Russian influence in Cyprus. The analysis postulates that the re-emergence of great power rivalry necessitates a reexamination of historical strategy paradigms to adequately respond to evolving geopolitical dynamics. Through exploring these themes, this paper aims to elucidate how systemic changes and strategic priorities shape state behavior and foreign policy decision-making amid the ongoing American effort to assert influence in the Eastern Mediterranean while countering Russian presence.