Toward a Realist Principle of Inclusion

Historically, the question of how we ought to construct the demos was not given the same attention as other matters within democracy. All collective decisions are constituted through some democratic legitimacy demand, that is, political decision ought to be seen as legitimate for those bound by the decisions taken. The question of who should form part of that demos, the boundaries between participant and non-participant, and thus who is able to enjoy the rights and benefits of political membership must be answered before any further democratic formation take place. If we understand democracy as rule by and for the people, there was historically more focus on concepts relating to how collectives rule and the institutions of democracy, than was given to how we should understand ‘the people’. This is problematic, as who the people are often influences the way in which they can rule, and how we constitute what it means to rule places boundaries on who makes up the people (Dahl, 1970, p. 59). Historically, three principles have been offered that attempt to solve this problem: the all-affected interests principle (Whelan, 1983; Dahl, 1970; Goodin, 2007), the coercion principle (Abizadeh, 2008, 2010; Miller 2009; Erman 2014), and the identity principle (Song, 2012; Benhabib, 2004, 2005). However, these current frontrunner principles that attempt to solve the boundary problem do not offer a satisfactory answer. This talk will look to explore the current methodology present within mainstream principles of inclusion. I will argue that each principle is grounded on a similar methodological focus on ethical normativity. I will argue that by understanding how these principles appeal to justifications through political moralism, we can understand why they are unsatisfactory. Principles of inclusion that are grounded in political moralism fail to sufficiently account for the political nature of demos formation. Instead, these principles place demos formation outside of the political, toward some abstract ideal. I will then present my realist account of a principle of inclusion. I will offer a political normativity based on storytelling as a tactic that aims at stability as a distinct political value. That is to say, we ought to judge a political community through its commitment to legitimacy above justice. By understanding how political communities aim at stability above all else, we can understand how political communities form in historical contexts as well as how they may fall/be absorbed/break apart through history. We can also develop action-guiding prescriptions through our understanding of political normativity based on stability that aims at legitimacy. I will argue that we can understand ‘good’ demos formations through this normativity. This protects my thesis from the charge of being an agnostic account of the boundary question like Schumpeter’s approach.