This paper studies how parties regulate demands for descriptive representation by a growing number of social groups and the extent to which this introduces competition to intra-party candidate selection. More specifically we examine if the demand for descriptive representation of women and ethnic minorities interacts, and if so, how this is influenced by gender quotas. Based on a study of two cases, namely Belgium and the Netherlands, we argue that gains for one (minority) group might come disproportionally at the expense of another.
In both Belgium and the Netherlands, ethnic minority women are relatively better represented than ethnic minority men. However, in the Netherlands, the representation of ethnic minority women also comes at the expense of majority women. In our study, we test whether this effect can be attributed to different uses of gender quotas in the two countries. Belgium was one of the first countries in Europe to adopt legally binding gender quotas for electoral lists in 1994 and 2002. In the Netherlands, some leftist parties have adopted voluntary gender quotas, but there is usually more reluctance to enshrine structural measures.
To this end, we will study electoral lists in Belgium and the Netherlands intersectionally. First, we analyze the proportions of women and ethnic minority candidates (and the intersections between the two) on electoral lists over time (1991/1994-2010). In addition, we conduct interviews with party selectors for the 2010 elections. We select two parties in Belgium with legally binding quotas, two parties in the Netherlands with voluntary quotas and two parties with no quotas.
By approaching representation intersectionally, we focus –unlike the established literature on quotas– not on women as one homogenous group and their underrepresentation. Instead we try to gain insights in the overrepresentation of ethnic minority women.
