Unveiling An Overlooked Pattern of Global Governance: A Theory of Autocratic International Institutionalisation (AII)?

The study of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) has long been framed within the neo-liberal paradigm and thus, assumed the formation, functioning and interrelationship of IGOs to be driven by liberal principles, echoing the Kantian vision of “perpetual peace” through international cooperation. Consequently, autocratic practices with international organisations are considered often from the perspective of contestation of liberal international institutionalism or more broadly, the liberal international order (LIO). In doing so, the literature primarily treats the troubling engagement of autocracies with international organisations as “deviant points” in the overall pattern and hence, tends to overlook the potential for autocratic principles of international institutionalisation. The third wave of regionalism studies – that is, comparative regionalism – has partially addressed this problem of ignorance of autocratic practices of international institutionalisation by paving the way for the emergence of studies on authoritarian regionalism. Authoritarian regionalism studies, in turn, have largely focused on the benefits that autocracies seek from regional cooperation, judging by their motivation or teleologically, by the functions of regional organisations for autocratic regimes. Even though this strand of literature has delivered some significant findings into the autocracy-IGO nexus, it has remained confined to the limits of regionalism, without yielding any broader theoretical insights for autocratic international institutionalisation. On the other hand, the literature on autocratic regimes demonstrates that autocracies do rely on institutionalisation at home for their survival. However, the broader international dimension of autocratic institutionalisation remains untheorised and hence, empirically insufficiently explored. Such a gap in theory has two major implications. First, without the theorising of autocratic international institutionalisation, the theory of international institutionalisation can by no means be considered mature. Secondly, given the state-of-art in the literature, it is hardly possible to have an understanding of autocratic international institutionalisation beyond the lenses of contestation and regional clubbing of authoritarian regimes. The significance of filling this knowledge gap – that is, developing a theory of autocratic international institutionalisation (AII) – is further exacerbated by the global surge in authoritarian inclinations paralleled by the growing contestation of the international liberal order and the emergence of alternative international institutions led by autocracies such as China and Russia. Ultimately, the questions are: What types of IGOs are favoured by autocratic regimes? In what ways do regime-specific characteristics shape the IGO preferences of autocracies? How does the approach of autocracies to IGO membership differ from that of democracies? The proposed article first discusses the underpinning assumptions of an assertion for an AII theory, establishing them in mathematical formulas, and consequently, discusses the relevant strands of literature in search of answers to the questions posed above. Ultimately, the article suggests that first, autocracies may have preferences for particular IGOs and in this, they may differ from democracies, and second, regime characteristics such as regime type, tenure and economic capacity can potentially determine autocratic preferences for IGOs. Lastly, the article explores the implications of “clubbing” pattern observed on the regional level for the international dimension.