Bargaining Through Bullets: Strategic Violence in Afghanistan's Contentious Elections

This paper examines the strategic use of political violence within Afghanistan's complex war-to-peace transition (2001-2021). Despite the extensive literature on political violence, the dynamics of this multifaceted scenario remained underexplored. This study fills this gap through elite interviews that provide unique empirical insights. The research reveals the overlooked dimension of resources driving political violence. Incumbents exploited state resources for voter suppression. The opposition mobilized followers, using violence as bargaining leverage in post-election disputes. Insurgents, driven by ideology, escalated violence to undermine the political transition. Importantly, using electoral violence was costly for incumbents and the opposition due to its visibility. Violence depended on the balance of power between actors. For insurgents, violence was the main tool to delegitimize the process and outcome. In conclusion, comprehending these complex dynamics is crucial for policy interventions aimed at mitigating violence and consolidating democracy after the war. Findings underscore the importance of considering political settlements and elite bargaining when designing electoral assistance. This study makes a significant contribution by offering an empirical examination of the strategic logic of violence in Afghanistan's unique and understudied war-to-peace transition.