How Democratic is Consociational Democracy?

Consociational democracy is the answer to the question how democracy is possible in divided societies. It centers on cooperation rather than competition and is guided by four principles: a grand coalition government, proportionality, mutual veto, and segmental autonomy. The leading consociational author, Arend Lijphart, at first was rather apologetic about the democratic quality of consociational democracy, but later he changed his mind (Lijphart 2008). The main reason was that the classic West European consociations (Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) performed well in measures of (liberal) democracy. However, what about the new consociations in other parts of the world (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Iraq, Lebanon, Malaysia, Northern Ireland, South Africa)? And how well do the old cases still function? My paper provides an overview of the critics and criticisms of consociational democracy, building on Van Schendelen (1982) and Andeweg (2000). Do Lijphart’s replies to critics from 1985 still hold? Or O’Leary’s rebuttals from 2005? How have consociations dealt with the challenges of populism, polarization, and popular protest? My paper takes stock and evaluates. Next, it examines whether consociational democracies can be made more democratic, looking especially at the experience of referendums and at experiments with deliberative democracy. It identifies promises and tensions. For some critics, the role of ethnicity in politics by itself compromises its democratic quality. However, consociationalism is different from ethnic democracy and ethnocracy. And the literature on multiculturalism and group rights stresses the importance of recognition and inclusion. What we need, therefore, is a positive theory of consociationalism, not a defense, an apology, or the excuse that consociationalism is merely a transitional phenomenon. But that task is too big for this paper.