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Between Engagement and Conflict: Explaining Mafia Strategies towards Public Institutions in Italy

Conflict
Organised Crime
Political Parties
Southern Europe
Aldo Paparo
Università di Firenze
Aldo Paparo
Università di Firenze
Francesco N. Moro
Università di Bologna

Abstract

This paper explores the intricate relationship between the variegated strategies employed by organized crime (OC) in its interactions with public institutions and local political and economic conditions. The study meticulously investigates the diverse factors influencing OC groups to embrace distinct strategies, categorizing them as "parasitic," "collusive," and "adversarial." The multifaceted contribution of this research is twofold. Firstly, it advances a set of hypotheses delineating the mechanisms that connect political and economic configurations with OC's strategic determinations regarding business locations and the selection of operational strategies. The study introduces a comprehensive typology that illuminates the intricate web of OC activities and their complex relationships with local political arenas. Secondly, the paper empirically corroborates these hypotheses through an extensive and original dataset encompassing 8,000 Italian municipalities. This empirical approach lends robust support to the theoretical framework, shedding light on the dynamic interplay between political structures and OC decision-making. The findings unearth a compelling pattern: collusive strategies are most likely to manifest in local contexts where political systems exhibit susceptibility to infiltration, often stemming from the limited strength of political parties. In such environments, OC finds fertile ground for cooperation and collaboration. Conversely, adversarial situations materialize in high-stakes scenarios where OC resorts to threats and violence to coerce advantages in the allocation of public funding. This revelation underscores the pivotal role of power dynamics and resource allocation in shaping the antagonistic relationships between OC and public institutions. The research underscores the need for a nuanced understanding of the intricate interconnections between local political and economic landscapes and OC strategies, offering insights that extend beyond the Italian context to inform a broader comprehension of OC dynamics. The typology introduced herein not only enhances academic discourse on this pressing issue but also provides a valuable framework for policymakers and law enforcement agencies grappling with the multiple challenges posed by OC in diverse socio-political contexts.