At the Crossroads of Modern Liberal Democracy: The Case of Kant

Immanuel Kant is often praised as the founding father of modern liberal democracy who anchors political legitimacy in the principle of popular sovereignty, endorses separation of powers, and fathered the idea of the juridical state (Rechtsstaat). Prominently, John Rawls’ (1999; 1995) and Jürgen Habermas’ (1994) comprehensively utilize Kantian figures of thought to develop their political theories, which can be labeled "Kantian liberalism" (Gray 1992, p. 13). The ‘liberal-democratic’ assimilation of Kant draws on an influential interpretation that regards him as a genuinely democratic thinker. As Habermas puts it, Kant demands a "total transformation of authority into self-legislation" (Habermas 1996, p. 496). In a similar manner, Ingeborg Maus argues that Kant "leaves no doubt" that "only democratic lawmaking is legitimate" (Maus 1994, p. 332). She infers that Kant, as his successors Rawls and Habermas, is essentially resorting to a post/non-metaphysical mode of justification of political rule. I argue that this Rousseauian-inspired reading of Kant is problematic for systematic and textual reasons. My interpretation will illustrate that the Kantian idea of moral autonomy does not translate into the demand for democratic self-legislation. I argue that Kant’s political thought oscillates between the poles of popular sovereignty on the one hand and the authority of the empirical legislator on the other without unilaterally resolving this tension. Kant’s distinction between the ‘form of sovereignty’ and the ‘form of government’, his insistence on representation as the core of republican governance, and his determination of the ‘general will’ as a non-empirical test criterion for rightful legislation will prove crucial. Particular attention will also be paid to the often neglected significant statement by Kant that democracy is "in the strict sense of the word […] necessarily a despotism." (8: 352) Discussing the theoretical implications of these points is not only of substantial historical interest but also to contemporary liberal-democratic theory building. I demonstrate that Kant’s reservations about direct democracy, for instance, are everything other than anachronistic. Especially in the light of criticism of liberal-democratic theory-building that seems to be "Lost in Rawlsland" (Mills 2014), they appear more current than ever as they point to the blind spots of current theory building. For this reason, Kant’s political thought represents a splendid invitation to reflect on our entrenched (often liberal) intuitions on political legitimacy, and it can enrich our view through productive irritation rather than reassurance of our liberal-democratic convictions. It may turn out that Kant offers us a political perspective that, while recognizably liberal in many ways, opens up a dimension beyond the liberal paradigm neglected by both contemporary liberalism and its critics, and this may prove to be theoretically more interesting and promising than his intersections with the liberal tradition. Moving out of "Rawlsland" can mean returning to the crossroads of liberal theory-making, acknowledging that our presumptions are not the only possible ones, and exploring which paths have not been taken.