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Fair Opportunity for Speech

Human Rights
Political Theory
Freedom
Ethics
Normative Theory
Jonathan Seglow
Royal Holloway, University of London
Jonathan Seglow
Royal Holloway, University of London

Abstract

Though everyone agrees that free speech is an important liberty, there has been little discussion of the distribution of opportunities to enjoy it. This paper explores the issue of fair opportunities for speech, based upon a distinctive view of speech’s value. In essence, speech is valuable because, through uptake of one another’s communication, speakers mutually affirm each other’s agency, thus answering their need for recognition (Honneth 1995). More than Millian, autonomy-based and even democratic justifications of free speech’s value, the recognitional view implies that limited opportunities for speech is an injustice. Further, on the recognitional view, individuals’ speech can both enable and set back (e.g hate speech) the speech opportunities of others. I distinguish between direct speech among a few interlocutors and diffuse speech to larger numbers, often in the public sphere. Direct speech commonly enjoys uptake, but a right to uptake, as part of the right to free speech, is implausible. Instead, I argue, there should be fair opportunities to secure uptake for diffuse speech. I outline four (overlapping, inter-connected) sets of obstacles to fair opportunities for speech. First, there are inequalities of wealth, income, education, and time free from work and other responsibilities. Second, there are laws and regulations governing institutions such as workplaces, political parties and universities; broadcast and print media; as well as laws on hate speech, defamation, protest etc. Third, there are the policies of digital platforms and social media corporations, which shape how individuals’ messages are promoted, demoted, flagged, or their accounts suspended or deleted. Fourth, there are social norms which can both impede speech opportunities (e.g. public shaming) and enable it (e.g. norms of respectful listening in political debate). This complex picture makes theorising the notion of fair opportunities speech a challenging task, and hence realising it in practice is demanding too.