Research on patronage indicates the lack of policy-making capability as a justification for appointments of party affiliates to lower ranks in the bureaucracy. In multiparty presidential systems, apart from the traditionally spotlighted portfolio design negotiations, access to such positions is also a bargaining chip when forming coalitions. The literature has overlooked how the policy-making process is influenced by appointments of coalition parties’ affiliates into these lower ranks. I argue that the allocation of lower rank positions plays a significant role on the maintenance of governability, by providing contingent support when bills of presidential interest are being voted in congress. To test this theory, I investigate the case of Brazil and the degrees of loyalty of coalition deputies toward presidents, from 2001 to 2018, by examining deputies’ behavior when voting for bills in roll call votes. I examine the extent to which a coalition deputy can be influenced by the provision of new appointments to their party during roll call voting for bills of presidential interest.
