The Brazilian universal higher education system is characterised by the prominent role of the national government in offering federal universities among its subnational regions. However, the asymmetric distribution of those intuitions throughout subnational regions challenges the universalist approach to public higher education. Why are federal universities unevenly distributed throughout the country? We argue that neither labour market needs nor population demand appears to explain the distribution of universities within the national territory. Alternatively, We claim that the electoral arena and political ambitions influence representatives’ decision-making in creating higher education institutions, allowing political elites to claim credit for public good, thus increasing their electoral support. Using Brazil as a case, we test the influence of political alignment and ideology, the share of votes in national elections, and the birthplace bias of the representatives on the provision of higher education. To test this claim, we leverage data from creating 25 higher education institutions combined with representative-level electoral and political data at the national and subnational level in the 26 states and the Federal District since the re-democratisation to the last presidential term (1988-2022). Our preliminary findings suggest that the allocation of higher education institutions in Brazil is used as a political instrument for representatives to increase their electoral support at the risk of jeopardising industrial and higher education policies.