Comparative Historical Analysis in Political Theory

In this paper I engage two key themes that have been central topics of methodological debate in recent political theory: the use of history and its implications for normative political argument, and the importance of (cross cultural) comparison and the way it may be used to extend or challenge political theory. But I seek to take these themes in a new direction. Thus far, the debate over history’s role in political theory has focused on the question of historical context as key to interpreting, and potentially limiting the reach of, normative ideas (Floyd and Stears 2011). The debate over comparison has focused on ‘comparative political theory’ that examines traditions of political thought that lie outside the established Western canon, come from sources or agents beyond classic ‘intellectuals’, or cross cultural boundaries (Vocano 2015). Here I propose a new line of inquiry (albeit one that overlaps with these debates) over the use of comparative historical analysis (a methodological approach more associated with political science) in political theory. In political science, comparative historical analysis denotes, roughly, the systematic use of historical research and historical logics of inquiry in comparative case studies to advance the interpretation and causal explanation of political behaviour. By contrast with the parsimonious analyses of most quantitative research methods, or more narrowly specified case studies, comparative historical analysis uses rich descriptions of historical cases as a kind of ‘quasi-experiment’ to identify key causal mechanisms and dynamics, motives and intentions, and mentalities and structures, that appear crucial to certain political outcomes. I argue that there are parallel uses for comparative historical analysis in political theory in service of its conceptual and normative inquiry. I explicate how comparative historical analysis may be used for these aims as a means for drawing greater analysis of real behaviour into political theory. I suggest that there are three main ways comparative historical analysis may do this: ‘deductively’ (to test existing conceptual and normative assumptions and arguments against cases), ‘inductively’ (to identify conceptual needs, normative problems, and normative claims based on cases), and, combining the two, ‘casuistically’ (to refine concepts and arguments by seeking to extend them from one case to another). Based on these claims, I argue that comparative historical analysis should be much more widely recognised and used by political theorists. I also caution, however, about an overestimation of what such analysis can tell us. Comparative historical analysis is a tool, and it must be combined with other tools – including philosophically rigorous reasoning – to build robust concepts and normative arguments.