Consenting to comply? Does uncontested jurisdiction affect compliance in ISDS cases?

International lawyers suggest that voluntary acceptance of the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal will result in better compliance with judgments or awards issued from that instance. If a State freely consents to the procedure itself – the argument goes – it also accepts to be bound by the outcome of the procedure. Yet, this theory has been questioned in the context of judgments of the International Court of Justice, where it has been argued that neither the basis of jurisdiction nor the fact that jurisdiction was contested affect the final compliance outcome. In this paper we explore to what extent, and under what circumstances, the jurisdictional issue is related to compliance with awards from investor-state dispute settlement cases. In doing so, we theorize how variations in consent to ISDS on the part of the state might affect their willingness to comply with subsequent adverse awards. We also discuss the different ways states may signal objection to the jurisdiction of an ISDS tribunal through their in-court pleadings. In our empirical analysis we rely on two novel datasets: one mapping the jurisdictional objections states make in their ISDS cases, and one on state compliance with ISDS awards. In addition to structured data, we have interviewed state officials about the legal strategy and usage of jurisdictional objections in ISDS pleadings.