Can democracy cure epistemic injustice?

This paper responds to the sweeping conclusion, drawn by many studies of epistemic injustice, that ‘democracy’ can somehow be the remedy to knowledge-related forms of oppression. It takes this idea as a starting point and elaborates on it from a perspective that interlinks democratic theory, institutional analysis and social epistemology, by asking: Can democracy be a cure to epistemic injustice? What does it take for socially disadvantaged groups to become more articulate and recognized as holders of knowledge and how would this translate into democratic institutions? In the paper’s first part, Miranda Fricker’s original distinction between hermeneutical and testimonial epistemic injustice is complemented by access-denying forms of epistemic injustice that are caused by being excluded from knowledge acquiring, production and dissemination regimes. The paper then explores the cures that democratic institutions might provide to these different forms of epistemic injustice. It discusses, inter alia, how epistemic practices can be opened up without jeopardising knowledge quality, how more inclusive norms of communication can be institutionalised and how social communities can be supported in conveying marginalised perspectives.