Parliamentary oversight committees: Where the partisan logic meets the institutional logic

Parliamentary oversight is a challenged activity, especially in parliamentary systems. Institutionally, the expectation is that actors in parliament oversee government's use of delegated powers, including administrative mal-administration, but at the same time the strong role of political parties means that party representatives pursue partisan goals, which might not include attendance to oversight cases or only if the case relates to partisan goals. In parliamentary oversight committees, these two logics are confronted the most, and this article argues that a stronger institutionalized setting strengthens the parliamentary logic and dampens the partisan logic in treatment of oversight cases. The article tests this argument by an investigation of oversight cases and the degree of unity in outcome across government and opposition party distinctions. The investigation applies a cross-sectional comparative approach by selecting oversight cases from different committees as well as from different parliaments, the three Scandinavian parliaments. Overall, the results show a high degree of unity in the committee outcome in this type of cases, but also variation depending on committee design and case type.