‘Tactical Use of Armed Struggle’: The IRA’s Purpose in Irish Republican Strategy, 1969 to 2005

Between 1969 and 1997, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) waged an armed campaign against British rule in Northern Ireland. Only in 2005 did they publicly end ‘armed struggle’, seven years after the Good Friday peace agreement. Some scholars suggest Republicans always saw the IRA as one of the principal ways to achieve Irish unification. They argue the IRA only eventually ended their campaign because the organization faced terminal decline. Others outline how the IRA alongside other political means were viewed by Republicans as being equally crucial to achieving unity. In their view, the IRA faced a stalemate by the 1990s, leading to a political compromise. This paper develops ideas from Ó Dochartaigh’s and my earlier research on different topics. Using memoirs, interviews and the latest Irish/UK government archival papers, I argue Irish Republican leaders always viewed their armed campaign as a tactic. They did not believe the IRA alone could achieve unification but felt it could get them into talks with the UK Government and others to achieve concessions. Between 1969 and 1975, Republican leaders viewed the IRA as the main tactic to get Republicans into talks and achieving concessions. After failing to reach a political settlement again during a ceasefire in 1975, Republican tactics altered. They believed the IRA was still required to pressurise the UK Government back to negotiations. But a political mandate was also crucial to ensure their opponents could not backtrack from granting concessions and a political settlement once IRA activity ceased. This ‘Armalite and Ballot Box’ strategy lasted until 1997. The spectre of the IRA remained in the background until 2005 in case the British Government avoided implementing compromises agreed in the peace agreement. During the IRA’s ceasefire from 1994 they discussed ‘TUAS’, which some authors believe meant ‘Tactical Use of Armed Struggle’. This phrase best explains the IRA’s role in Republican strategy from 1969 to 2005. This case study gives us important insight into how violence can be deployed strategically by armed groups to reach a negotiated political settlement.