A geopolitical turnabout in export control policies? Comparing the EU and the US approaches in high-tech relations with China

Against the background of renewed strategic competition, systemic rivalry and rising levels of geopolitical tensions and conflict, cutting-edge and enabling technologies have emerged as a defining source of power. The ability to control and innovate advanced technologies has become a crucial determinant of economic strength, military capabilities, and overall geopolitical influence. Furthermore, governments increasingly tend to assess trade and investment in critical technologies through the lens of perceived security risks they might entail. This holds true for FDI in critical infrastructure, the access to enabling technologies (e.g. AI or quantum computing), or trade in dual-use technologies. Economic security and resilience gain in importance as policy goals. Against the background of a "geopoliticization" of technological relations and competition, governments can basically adopt three different strategies to deal with related challenges: shielding, stifling, and spurring (Roberts et al. 2019). 1. They can shield themselves against potential risks emanating from allowing competitors access to their own technologies. 2. They can stifle the technological and economic advancement of competitors. 3. They can spur the technological advancement of their own companies and economy by doubling down on their research and development and industrial policy activities in selected high-tech areas. Export controls in high-tech areas can pursue both shielding and stifling objectives. By introducing export controls, governments can pursue the goal of denying foreign competitors access to their own companies’ cutting-edge technologies. In case these are of an enabling and foundational kind, export controls moreover serve stifling purposes. They can be intended to slow down or hinder broader technological breakthroughs in transformative technologies (e.g. quantum computing or AI) serving as the basis for dynamic economic sectors and can thereby profoundly affect the economic power resources of a strategic competitor. This paper intends to compare the specific choices of EU and US policymakers when defining their response to China as the main technological competitor and the relative importance they attach to shielding and stifling strategies in the area of export controls. Our research question reads as follows: which explanatory factors (economic interests, security interests, ideational factors) account for the particular mix of these potential strategies of the EU and the US in countering challenges and risks stemming from high-tech competition and cooperation with China? To answer this question, we will provide comparative case studies on recent evolutions of export control regimes in the EU and the US. References: Roberts, A., Choer Moraes, H., and Ferguson, V., 2019. Toward a Geoeconomic Order in International Trade and Investment. Journal of International Economic Law, 22 (4), 655–676.