Poland has put for years now closer integration of its eastern neighbours – particularly Ukraine – on top of its priorities within the EU. It was bringing a membership perspective for Eastern neighbours a key underlying motivation for Polish-Swedish proposal to initiate Eastern Partnership. The Polish government was primarily capitalizing on its own successful experience of democratic transformation from the 1990s that drove the attention paid to democracy support. However, the practice was much more complicated than declarations, and Poland was struggling to become (even a regional) leader in the area. The Polish democracy support for EaP countries became further undermined by two factors. On the one hand, domestic developments such as growing conflicts over standards of democracy in Poland as visible in long-lasting rule of law conflict with the European Commission that PiS government engaged with since 2015 put into question how that may translate into Poland’s credibility as democracy supporter. On the other hand, Russian aggression against Ukraine first in 2014 and then full military aggression in 2022 made these efforts more complicated and pushed democracy support to the secondary position after military support. What remains understudied is how these two internal and external factors impacted Polish foreign policy narratives on post-war rebuilding, development, and democratization in Ukraine and EaP partner countries. The paper will analyse the changing frames of democracy support in Poland for its neighbours in the context of EU decision in the midst of the conflict to offer Ukraine candidacy status elevating its position in the EU's transformational policies of development aid, economic and social transformations and democratization. Empirically, we will provide a discursive analysis of shifts within foreign policy frames by Polish political actors (governing and in opposition) as well as civil society actors engaged in democracy support for Eastern neighbours.