Post-Colonial land acquisition (appropriation?) in Singapore. How ideas and political pragmatism shaped state capture of land value uplift before development.

Lee Kuan Yew’s People’s Action Party (PAP) won political control of Singapore, engineering independence both from Britain and the Federation of Malaysia to perpetuate the free trading entrepot tradition. He was determined that Singapore would develop economically, and his incentives for foreign direct investment and preference for stable government are well known. Less well known are his Socialist roots, and a series of measures to secure 90% of the land in public ownership, so that the uplift in value after development would be captured for public benefit. This paper will identify the origin of Lee’s land regime, its legal structure and his ideological influences. He wrote ‘I saw no reason why private landowners should profit from an increase in land value brought about by economic development and the infrastructure paid for with public funds’ (Lee, 2011:97). In Parliament (1994) he said ‘things have to be done which are unpleasant. I changed the acquisition laws… it was Robin Hood but I succeeded in giving everybody their own home’ quoted in (Han, Fernandez and Tan, 2015:341). Norwegian Town Planner Erik Lorange, led a UNDP delegation to Singapore in 1962 and advised ‘the necessary legislative basis for compulsory acquisition of land for all kinds of planning purpose must therefore be secured’ (Lorange, 1962:27); he also suggested that this land in turn should be offered to developers on 99 year leases in return for an upfront premium and annual ground rent. The centrepiece in this programme of reform (revolution?) was the Land Acquisition Act of 1966, which enabled the state to acquire land ‘for any public purpose’ with no avenue for legal challenge, while compensation was decided at existing (and historic) use value by Tribunal. The accumulated proceeds of Government Land Sales are treated as past reserves, while up to 50% of the investment income from these funds now contribute 20% of Singapore’s operating budget. The logic of this arrangement will be challenged by reference to land rent theory, highlighting some of the consequences and contradictions facing policy makers today in dealing with two classes of ‘property’ owners: freeholders with ever rising asset value, against a growing cohort of leaseholders with falling asset value. Affordable housing is a key signifier of satisfaction with the (still) ruling PAP. For Lee, giving citizens a stake in the nation through homeownership (90% are property owners) was a defining feature of his ideology together with an emphasis on self-reliance. It worked for a time, but leaseholders can now see their stakes eroding in value, while an elite minority are protected by anomalous freehold tenures. As Edward Shepherd says ‘once ideology collides with real world problems, it must rearticulate in sometimes contradictory ways in order to arrive at practical solutions’ (Shepherd, 2020:24). In 1960 Lee referred to the PAP as ‘a revolutionary not a reformist movement’, (Han, Fernandez and Tan, 2015:345). In which direction will the novel land regime in Singapore rearticulate? Towards a fulfilment of Lee’s revolution, or towards a more conventional, western pattern of private ownership?