How do citizens view these programs when governments enter into agreements with the International Monetary Fund? How do program design and content variations influence people's opinions of them? Do people support cuts or react with horror? How do people's evaluations of the IMF change depending on how much they know of these programs? If more people know about these programs, do they become less supportive of the Fund? Given our focus on micro-foundations, we propose a survey experiment with non-elite respondents in a country with a current IMF program and a looming election, such as Pakistan. We use an information treatment to probe whether changing information about who is affected by the costs of adjustment affects people's support for the program. Detailed informational treatments can move public opinion about the IMF program. Respondents significantly reduce their support for the IMF program when we emphasize specific adjustment costs like tax hikes and spending cuts. In contrast, when we emphasize the continuity of social protection under the adjustment program, respondents significantly increase their support for the IMF program. These results indicate that respondents are sensitive to the content of IMF programs. Overall, designing social protection measures in a program can offset the negative effect of austerity measures on program support.
