Heterogeneous Electoral Constituencies against Factionalism

In Federalist 10, James Madison suggests that more diverse or heterogeneous electoral constituencies can provide a remedy against factionalism. Inspired by the pluralist reading of Federalist 10, I provide in this paper a novel defence of heterogeneous constituencies that are constructed through stratified random sampling. At the heart of my thesis lies a model of conflict management that emphasises the value of pluralisation and the importance of breaking down rather than fostering the salience of deep-seated conflicts. While geographic and other category-based constituencies crystallise and consolidate reinforcing cleavages, heterogeneous constituencies, I argue, stimulate the politicisation of new and potentially cross-cutting cleavages. The presence of cross-cutting cleavages enables representatives to engage in processes of accommodation and cooperation across group divisions, such as processes of bargaining and coalition-building, while remaining partial advocates of their constituents’ interests. Furthermore, I connect this notion of conflict management to party democracy in PR systems and argue that multiple party affiliations can further contribute to the de-politicisation of deep-seated conflicts by blurring societal divisions. The upshot is that stratified random constituencies with PR are a candidate for the institutional default in all contemporary democracies facing factionalist tendencies as well as the factionalist threats of majority tyranny and legislative gridlocks.