A social network approach to violent extremist mobilisation: a qualitative study of young jihadist sympathizers in Spain

Research has found a clear link between social ties and jihadist mobilisation. However, most studies have failed to acknowledge two important dual dimensions of this relationship. Firstly, both jihadist sympathizers who participate in jihadist activities and jihadist sympathizers who do not, share interpersonal connections to militants who are already active within the global jihadist movement (GJM). Secondly, sympathizers who participate in jihadist activities have social ties that both facilitate and oppose their mobilisation process. Therefore, participation in political violence 1) may not occur despite the presence of social networks that promote it, while 2) it may occur despite the presence of social networks that deter it. Consequently, the question that requires further attention is what the actual impact of social ties in extremist mobilization is. To address this question, this paper attempts to empirically assess the role of social networks in leading young people in Spain to support and in some cases join the GJM during the mobilization cycle initiated by the Syrian civil war and the rise of Islamic State (2012-2019). Specifically, this research attempts to develop an integrative analytical framework of the multiple mobilization functions fulfilled by different ties at the diverse stages of mobilization, integrating both movement and extra-movement ties. To do so, the present study examines the social networks of a sample of 44 young people mobilized by GJM organizations in Spain between 2012 and 2019, 23 of whom participated in jihadist activities and were consequently convicted of terrorism offences. Information on their ego-networks was drawn from semi-structured interviews with several of these youths, their relatives, police experts, or first-line practitioners, as well as from law enforcement reports contained in court files, and from attendance at oral trials. The model is grounded on a wide range of primarily political science literature in the subfields of social movement studies and political psychology, blended with theory and research in terrorism studies. The model assumes that not all ties that generate mobilization potential (mainly through the generation of collective identities, the construction of interpretative and action frames, the formation of social norms, and the activation of emotions) seek to promote participation, and that pre-existing ties may even attempt to limit it. Weak ties, which tend to be short-lived, may fail to facilitate structural connection, whereas strong ties are more effective because of their ability to generate incentives and sanctions. The model also proposes that young people with a greater number of ties with jihadist militants are more likely to have ties that facilitate structural connection with the GJM and, therefore, to end up participating. Finally, the model assumes that countervailing ties create obstacles (informational, structural, social) during the mobilization process, but jihadists participants can overcome them partly by leveraging ties that facilitate mobilization.